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In response to Davidson’s ‘On the very idea of a conceptual scheme’ (1974), Lynch 
(1997), Wang (2009), and others have argued that Davidson did in fact not attack 
the veryLGHDEXWDVSHFL¿FYHUVLRQRIWKHLGHDQDPHO\4XLQH’s, and that there may 
be other versions that are (more or less) immune to the attack. Lynch suggests a 
Wittgensteinian theory, and Wang follows a suggestion by McDowell, but even 
among the members of the odd band of ‘schemers’ that Davidson explicitly targeted 
WKHUHPD\EHVRPHWKDWKLVDUURZVPLVV6XUHO\:KRUIDQG%HUJVRQZHUHQRW4XLQ-
eans, and Kuhn expressed his dissatisfaction with Davidson’s interpretation on a 
number of occasions.
'DYLGVRQGLGQRW LQWHQG WR MXVW DWWDFN4XLQHDQ FRQFHSWXDO UHODWLYLVP EXW DPXFK
broader range of scheme theories, some mentioned explicitly, some suggested by 
the metaphors he used and borrowed. ‘Conceptual schemes, we are told, are ways 
of organizing experience; they are systems of categories that give form to the data 
of sensation; they are points of view from which individuals, cultures, or periods 
survey the passing scene’ (p.183). ‘Points of view’ is the central metaphor of per-
spectivism, which has been ascribed at times to Heraclitus, Leibniz, Nietzsche, 
Searle, Zhuangzi (莊子), Dôgen (道元), and a few others; and considering the im-
mense differences between (the interpretations of) the apparent relativisms of these 
philosophers, if there is a doctrine of ‘perspectivism’, it is a very heterogeneous 
one. The point of view from ‘periods’ may be a reference to conceptual relativism 
in the history of ideas, hermeneutics, philology, and so forth (or could be easily 
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(mis-) understood as such): Pocock’s (1971) paradigms or langues, Foucault’s
(1966, 1969) discourses and épistèmes, Gadamer’s (1960) horizons (an intentional-
ly perspectivist metaphor), and so forth. In a similar fashion, (the point of view 
from) ‘cultures’ could be (understood as) a reference to conceptual relativisms in 
(linguistic) anthropology (that mostly derive from Whorf). Furthermore, in (1988)
Davidson also mentioned ‘ideologies’, which is one of the two scheme-like notions 
in the (early) work of Marx and Engels (e.g. 1846/1932) (the other is ‘conscious-
ness’)$QGRI WKHPDQ\VWLOOXQPHQWLRQHGWKHRULHVWKDWPRUHRU OHVV¿W'DYLGVRQ’s
general description of conceptual schemes, Kelly’s (1955) personal constructs in 
psychology and Goffman’s (1974) theory of frames in sociology and communica-
WLRQVFLHQFHDUHSHUKDSVWZRRIWKHPRVWLQÀXHQWLDO
It is, of course, unlikely that Davidson had all of these in mind, but because of the 
XQGHUVSHFL¿FDWLRQRI WKH LQWHQGHG WDUJHW WKH\ DOO VHHP WREHXQGHU DWWDFN0RUH-
over, although Davidson (1974)VXJJHVWHGLQKLV¿UVWVHQWHQFHWKDWFRQFHSWXDOUHOD-
tivism in philosophy was his prime target, he most explicitly directed his arrows at 
Whorf and Kuhn, a linguist and a ‘historian of science’ (rather than a philosopher; 
p.188).
The scheme-like theories by Whorf (1956), Kuhn (1962), and all of the scientists 
and philosophers mentioned in the second half of the preceding paragraph are ex-
amples of applied relativism. Such theories are generally developed or proposed in 
response to, and in explanation of, observed differences in conceptual conventions 
and apparent effects thereof on perception, thought and/or interpretation, and can 
EH IRXQG LQDQ\VFKRODUO\¿HOG WKDWGHDOVZLWKFRPSDULVRQRU LQWHUSUHWDWLRQDFURVV
boundaries of language, time, culture, tradition, or system of beliefs. Contrary to 
(most) conceptual relativisms in philosophy, applied relativisms are not about 
metaphysics, but about social explanation. Applied relativisms are very common, 
which illustrates their explanatory relevance, but tend to be theoretically (and/or 
philosophically) underdeveloped because of a focus on consequences rather than 
philosophical foundations. However, notwithstanding that underdevelopment and 
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the considerable differences between them, none of the applied relativisms men-
tioned (and perhaps even none of those not mentioned) FDQEH LGHQWL¿HGZLWK (or 
even be based on)WKH4XLQHDQYHUVLRQRIFRQFHSWXDOVFKHPHV(which Davidson at-
tacked).
1RQLGHQWL¿DELOLW\ZLWK4XLQHDQVFKHPHV LVQRJXDUDQWHH IRU LPPXQLW\RIFRXUVH
but reading Davidson from the perspective of applied relativism (or at least from a 
perspective constructed out of some common themes in those) could make one 
wonder whether applied relativism even needs immunity. As will be argued in this 
SDSHU WKHUHDUHVLJQL¿FDQWGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQ'DYLGVRQ’s and the applied schem-
ers’ notions of ‘non-intertranslatability’; Davidson’s understanding of the ‘organiz-
ing’ activity of schemes does not match that of the ‘schemers’; and the ‘¿WWLQJ’ met-
aphor does not fit. According to Wang (2009), Davidson’s argument against 
‘scheme - content dualism’ threatens conceptual relativism of any kind, but it is not 
entirely clear what the nature of this dualism is. In (1974) Davidson mentions the 
dualism as ‘the third dogma of empiricism’, but seems to identify it with the ‘orga-
nizing’ and ‘¿WWLQJ’ metaphors. ‘The myth of the subjective’ (1988) is considerably 
clearer about this dualism and what Davidson thinks that is wrong with it, but rais-
es doubt whether the dualism and the associated notion of ‘content’ make sense 
RXWVLGH WKH FRQWH[W RI4XLQHDQ HPSLULFLVPDQG VFKHPHV DV VHQWHQWLDO ODQJXDJHV
However, perhaps Davidson’s concern is not so much with the form of the dualism 
as with the distance it creates between appearances and the (real) world. There is 
an underlying dualism of phenomena and noumena that Davidson objects to (and 
not just in the two papers mentioned here), and that dualism, or at least that dis-
tinction, does indeed seem to be a necessary element of any conceptual relativism. 
It is, therefore, Davidson’s critique of this latter dualism that (applied) conceptual 
relativism needs to come to terms with, or disarm.
7KLV SDSHU FRQVLVWV RI WKUHH VHFWLRQV7KH¿UVW SUHVHQWV D EULHI FKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQRI
the (shared)FRUHLGHDRIDSSOLHGUHODWLYLVPDQGLGHQWL¿HVLWVNH\FRQFHSWV7KHVHF-
ond discusses Davidson’s (1974 and 1988) arguments against conceptual relativism, 
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and concludes that the only argument that does not immediately fail because of 
misunderstanding of (applied) relativism is the argument against ‘subjectivity’ and 
‘massive error’7KHWKLUGDQG¿QDOVHFWLRQWDNHVXSWKLV¿QDODUJXPHQWDQGVKRZV
that applied relativism is not (necessarily) subjective in the sense assumed by Da-
vidson, and does not (necessarily) imply the possibility of ‘massive and systematic 
deception by the senses’.
(Perhaps, the argument in this paper may seem to be an attempt to win a battle by 
withdrawing, to refute Davidson by means of a deflationary account of (some 
forms of) relativism. That would be a misunderstanding of the paper’s main point, 
however. It was Davidson who attempted to pull applied relativism into a battle 
where it did not belong, and the ‘GHÀDWLRQ’ LVPHUHO\ D FRUUHFWLRQRI DSULRU LQÀD-
WLRQWKDWIDOVL¿HGDQGRYHUH[WHQGHGWKHDSSOLHGUHODWLYLVWV’ ideas.)
a brief characterization of applied relativism
Applied relativisms are members of a broad family of theories explaining observed 
differences in conceptual conventions and apparent effects thereof on perception, 
WKRXJKW DQGRU LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ LQ VFLHQWL¿F¿HOGV GHDOLQJZLWK FRPSDULVRQRU LQWHU-
pretation across boundaries of language, time, culture, tradition, or system of be-
liefs. Despite the different theoretical contexts and explanatory roles, most of these 
WKHRULHV VKDUH D VPDOO QXPEHU RI FHQWUDO QRWLRQV WKDWZLOO EH LGHQWL¿HGEHORZ DO-
though these are not always explicitly mentioned. The general idea as found in or 
(implicitly) assumed by such theories can be summarized as follows: determinate 
phenomena (or phenomenal reality) are (is) constructed out of the indeterminate 
appearance we receive through our senses from noumenal reality, and our concep-
tual scheme provides us with a system of categories used in that construction (and
LQ WKDW VHQVH D FRQFHSWXDO VFKHPH LQGLYLGXDWHV LQ DQGRU FODVVL¿HV WKHQRXPHQDO
world). And therefore, different conceptual schemes result in different determinate 
phenomena (or different phenomenal worlds or realities).
The aforementioned ‘central notions’, perhaps even necessary elements, of (applied)
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relativism are (1) ‘determinate phenomena’ or ‘phenomenal reality’, (2) ‘indetermi-
nate appearance’, (3) ‘noumenal reality’, (4) ‘construction’, and (5) ‘conceptual 
scheme’. The noumenal - phenomenal distinction (3 vs. 1) is usually associated 
with Kant, but the intermediary notion of ‘indeterminate appearance’ is more rigor-
RXVO\ GHYHORSHG E\ WKH%XGGKLVW ORJLFLDQV DQG HSLVWHPRORJLVWV'LJQƗJD DQG
'KDUPDNƯUWL(resp. 5-6th and 7th century). In the Kantian framework, noumena are 
things-for-themselves and phenomena are things-as-they-appear. Noumenal reality 
is reality independent of our experience and phenomenal reality is reality as we 
consciously and conceptually experience it. Phenomenal experience (the experience 
of phenomenal reality) is always and necessarily conceptual(ized) experience – ex-
perience as. Phenomenal experience requires (prior) conceptualization: ‘to have the 
ability to notice a sort of thing is already to have the concept of that sort of thing’
(Sellars 1956, p. 176). Or, as Heidegger (1927) pointed out, we can only experi-
ence something as something.
In between these two ‘levels’RI UHDOLW\'LJQƗJDDQG'KDUPDNƯUWLSRVLWHGDQ LQWHU-
mediary. In 1\Ɨ\DELQGXSUDNDUDƼD 'KDUPDNƯUWL FDOOHG WKLV LQWHUPHGLDU\
‘SUDWLEKƗVD’, meaning (a.o.)UHÀHFWLRQRUDSSHDUDQFHDQGRSSRVHGLWWR‘SUDWLEKƗVD
SUDWƯWL’, which referred to phenomenal reality (or more commonly ‘conventional re-
ality’ in Buddhist philosophy). ‘3UDWƯWL’ (apprehension, distinction, etc.) here refers 
to the determinateness of some SUDWLEKƗ (appearances)DQGWKHODFNRIWKDWTXDOL¿-
cation in the term ‘SUDWLEKƗVD’ (in oppositon to SUDWLEKƗVDSUDWƯWL) was intended to 
express the indeterminateness thereof. Consequently, the pair of concepts can per-
haps be translated best as ‘indeterminate appearance’ (SUDWLEKƗVD) and ‘determinate
appearance’ (SUDWLEKƗVDSUDWƯWL). Determinate appearances, or determinate phenom-
ena, are (conceptually) constructed (NDOSDQD) out of indeterminate appearance 
(SUDWLEKƗVD)ZKLFKZDVGH¿QHGE\'LJQƗJDDV ‘free from conceptual construction 
/ nonconceptual (NDOSDQƗSRGKD)’ (3UDPƗƼDVDPXFFD\D 1.3c). Hence, contrary to 
necessarily conceptual phenomenal experience, indeterminate appearance is abso-
lutely non- (or pre-) conceptual – it is the ‘raw material’ out of which determinate 
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phenomena are constructed. That relation, however, is causal rather than epistemic 
– given the appropriate conceptual conventions (or schemes), phenomenal experi-
ences are caused by indeterminate appearance, itself caused by noumenal reality. 
Although indeterminate appearance is non-conceptual, it could be referred to in 
terms of its phenomenal effects (LQ WKH VDPHZD\ WKDW FDXVHV FDQEH LGHQWL¿HGE\
WKHLU HIIHFWVZLWKRXW LPSO\LQJ WKDW VXFK LGHQWL¿FDWLRQPHDQV LGHQWLW\). Those ef-
fects neither identify nor (fully, accurately) describe their causes. Indeterminate ap-
pearance is not ‘given’ sense data (see also Brons 2011). In a naturalistic interpreta-
tion, indeterminate appearance could be compared to the nerve signal before 
processing in the brain, and it does not make much sense to identify that nerve sig-
nal with the phenomenal experience it causes or to describe the latter as that nerve 
signal. Consequently, indeterminate appearance is more EHIRUH than in the mind.
In applied relativisms, the necessary elements (or central notions) mentioned above 
are usually confusingly inconsistently referred to by means of rather ambiguous 
metaphors. As correctly observed by Davidson, all these necessary elements can be 
found in the following (rather famous) quote from Whorf (1956), which also illus-
trates the usage of some of the most common metaphors:
We dissect naturea along lines laid down by our native languages. The catego-
ries and types that we isolate from the world of phenomenadZHGRQRW¿QG
there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the worlda
is presented in a NDOHLGRVFRSLFÀX[RILPSUHVVLRQVb which has to be organized 
by our minds – and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our mindsf.
We cut naturea up, organizef LW LQWR FRQFHSWV DQG DVFULEH VLJQL¿FDQFHV DVZH
do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this wayf – 
an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is FRGL¿HG LQ
the patterns of our languagef. The agreement is, of course, an implicit and un-
stated one, EXWLWVWHUPVDUHDEVROXWHO\REOLJDWRU\; we cannot talk at all except 
by subscribing to the RUJDQL]DWLRQDQGFODVVL¿FDWLRQf of datab which the agree-
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ment decrees. (...) no individual is free to describe naturea with absolute im-
partiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretationf even while he 
thinks himself most free. The person most nearly free in such respects would 
be a linguist familiar with very many widely different linguistic systemsf. (...)
We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all 
observers are not led by the same physical evidencee to the same picture of 
the universec, unless their linguistic backgroundsf are similar, or can in some 
way be calibrated. (p. 213-4; underlining and superscript letters added for ref-
erence)
The concepts of ‘nature’ and ‘world’ (superscript a) here refer to noumenal reality,
and ‘picture of the universe’ (c) refers to reality as we consciously experience it – 
to phenomenal reality. In between those two ‘worlds’ or ‘aspects’ or ‘levels’ of real-
ity (ODFNLQJ FOHDU GH¿QLWLRQV WKHVH WRR DUHPHWDSKRUV)ZH¿QG WKH ‘kaleidoscopic 
flux of impressions’ and ‘data’ (b). The essential difference between phenomenal 
reality and this intermediary, indeterminate appearance, is that the former is con-
ceptual (-ized), while the latter is completely pre-conceptual and formless. Addi-
tionally, there are a number of (even) more ambiguous concepts: ‘world of phe-
nomena’ (d) could be either phenomenal (as c), or another term for indeterminate 
appearance (as b); and ‘physical evidence’ (e), could be either noumenal reality (as
a) or indeterminate appearance (as b). Finally, the notions of ‘linguistic systems (in
our minds)’, the ‘ZD\VRI D RUJDQL]DWLRQ DQG FODVVL¿FDWLRQRI GDWD FRGL¿HG LQ WKH
patterns of our language’, the ‘modes of interpretation’, and ‘linguistic backgrounds’
(f) refer to conceptual schemes.
Among the various metaphors used for the central notions of applied relativism, 
the following are (probably) the most common:
(1)  determinate phenomena or phenomenal reality: the world, reality, experience, 
thick experience, conventional reality;
(2)  indeterminate appearance: experience, thin experience, surface irritations, 
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sensory promptings, sensory evidence, sensory experience;
(3) noumenal reality: reality, nature, the universe, the world, ultimate reality;
(4) construct/constructionRUJDQL]DWLRQFODVVL¿FDWLRQV\VWHPDWL]HGLYLGHXS
(5) conceptual scheme: language, perspective, frame.
The list is by no means complete, but even more confusing than the number of 
metaphors is the overlap in their usage – several metaphors are used for two essen-
tially different notions. ‘Experience’, for example, is used for both (1) and (2); and 
‘world’ for both (1) and (3) as in the following (famous) quote from Kuhn (1962):
‘paradigm changes do cause scientists to see the world of their research-engage-
ment differently. In so far as their only recourse to that world is through what they 
see and do, we may want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to 
a different world’ (p. 111; underlining added)7KH¿UVW WZRXVDJHVRI ‘world’ refer 
to noumenal reality (3), the third to phenomenal reality (1). It is such sloppy use of 
metaphors in theories that, moreover, lack rigorous foundations or elaborations that 
led to many of the misunderstandings of applied relativism.
Davidson’s arguments against conceptual schemes
There are two main lines of argument in Davidson’s ‘On the very idea of a concep-
tual scheme’ (1974) and in both the idea of ‘non-intertranslatability’ plays a leading 
UROH,QWKH¿UVW OLQH'DYLGVRQVXJJHVWVWKDW ‘two people have different conceptual 
schemes if they speak languages that fail of intertranslatability’ (p. 185), and that 
to be able to tell whether there are alternative conceptual schemes, we must be able 
to recognize something as a language (rather than meaningless sounds or scrib-
blings) without being able to translate any of it in our own, which is impossible. In 
the second line of argument, Davidson addresses what he calls ‘scheme - content 
dualism’ or ‘the third dogma of empiricism’, the idea that conceptual schemes orga-
QL]HJLYHVKDSHWRRU¿WVHQVRU\HYLGHQFHH[SHULHQFHRUQDWXUH+HGLVWLQJXLVKHV
two types of metaphors: schemes either ‘organize’ or ‘fit’ sensory evidence; and 
IDLOV WRPDNHVHQVHRI WKH¿UVWRI WKHVH,QFDVHRI WKH ‘¿WWLQJ’ metaphor, a scheme 
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is like a theory (of reality), and ‘IRUDWKHRU\WR¿WRUIDFHXSWRWKHWRWDOLW\RISRV-
sible sensory evidence is for that theory to be true’ (p. 193). However, truth cannot 
be separated from translation (or translatability): if a conceptual scheme is a (large-
ly) true theory, then we can translate it into a language we understand.
Despite the centrality of the notion, Davidson did not specify what exactly he 
meant with ‘translation’, and neither was he completely consistent in his terminolo-
gy. In one place (p. 184) he used ‘comparability’ rather than ‘translatability’, and 
elsewhere (p. 185) he described non-intertranslatability as ‘some form of activity 
could not be interpreted in our language’ (italics added). Perhaps the best clue 
about what Davidson meant can be found in his rather uncharitable reading of 
Whorf and Kuhn:
Whorf, wanting to demonstrate that Hopi incorporates a metaphysics so alien 
to ours that Hopi and English cannot, as he puts it ‘be calibrated’, uses English 
to convey the contents of sample Hopi sentences. Kuhn is brilliant at saying 
what things were like before the revolution using – what else? – our post-rev-
olutionary idiom. (p. 184)
Davidson’s interpretation of Kuhn’s, Whorf’s and similar conceptual relativisms ap-
pears to be approximately the following:
(1)  There are two conceptual schemes A and B which are ‘incommensurable’ or 
‘incalibratable’.
(1a)  ‘Incommensurable’ or ‘incalibratable’ mean that some things that can be said 
in A cannot be said in B (and vice versa), hence that A and B are ‘non-inter-
translatabe’.
(2)  It is possible to ‘convey the content’ of A sentences in B (and vice versa), or 
to ‘say what things were like’ in the A-situation in the B-language (and vice 
versa).
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(2a) ‘Convey the contents’ or ‘saying what things were like’ means ‘to translate’.
(3) Therefore, (1) and (2) are contradictory.
Of course, (3) only follows if (1a) and (2a) are conceded, and (1a) becomes mean-
ingful only in the light of (2a), which seems to be Davidson’VGH¿QLWLRQ(in a loose 
sense) of ‘translation’ (in the context of this argument). However, neither Kuhn, nor 
Whorf believed that ‘incommensurability’ or ‘incalibratability’ means untranslatable 
in the sense implied in (1a) and (2a). The contradiction in (3) is in fact so obvious 
that if Davidson had applied his own principle of charity, he would have rejected 
this interpretation.
The ascription of ‘incommensurable’ or ‘incalibratable’ to a difference between two 
conceptual schemes A and B in applied relativisms such as Kuhn’s and Whorf’s is 
a metaphor describing that A’s way of ‘seeing’ WKLQJV LV GLI¿FXOW (or unnatural) to 
express in B and (if symmetrical) vice versaRUWKDWWKHUHDUHVLJQL¿FDQWGLIIHUHQF-
es in meaning, form, connotations, and/or attributed truth values between seeming-
O\HTXLYDOHQWODQJXDJHIUDJPHQWVLQ$DQG%$VVRPHNLQGRIVXPPDUL]LQJGH¿QL-
tion, it can perhaps be said that two conceptual schemes A and B are ‘incommensu-
rable’, ‘incalibratable’, or ‘non-intertranslatable’ if a language fragment in A differs 
VLJQL¿FDQWO\ LQ LQWHQGHGPHDQLQJRUSXUSRVH LQDWWULEXWHG WUXWKYDOXH(in A), or in 
relevant connotations and associations from any single seemingly obvious equiva-
lent in B (and vice versa in case of symmetry). In other words, if a correct (and 
complete) interpretation or understanding is non-obvious and/or requires more or 
less extensive explanation, and thus depends on background knowledge about A 
and the uttered/written language fragment (ZKLFKPD\EH LQVXI¿FLHQWO\ DYDLODEOH).
Hence, non-intertranslatability – in this sense – does not equal non-interexplain-
DELOLW\ EXW SRLQWV DW D NLQGRI GLI¿FXOW\ LQ LQWHUH[SODQDWLRQ DQG WUDQVODWDELOLW\ LV
FRQWLQJHQWRQ WKHDYDLODELOLW\RI VXI¿FLHQWEDFNJURXQGNQRZOHGJH IRUDFFXUDWHH[-
planation.
231
Applied Relativism and Davidson’s Arguments against Conceptual Schemes
Davidson’s second line of argument concerns the rejection of ‘scheme - content du-
alism’. This dualism, and consequently, Davidson’s arguments against it, takes two 
slightly different forms in the two (main) papers that deal with it – in ‘On the very 
idea of a conceptual scheme’ (1974) the dualism is the idea that conceptual 
schemes ‘organize’ or ‘¿W’ some kind of ‘content’, while in ‘The myth of the subjec-
tive’ (1988) the focus is on the subjectivity of that ‘content’ as a source of ‘evi-
dence’. A further difference is that the ’74 version depends on the same notion of 
radical or absolute non-intertranslatability that was already rejected above, while 
the ‘YHUVLRQGRHVQRW7KDWDORQHLVVXI¿FLHQWWRLQYDOLGDWHWKH’74 version of the 
argument, but the two metaphors ‘¿WWLQJ’ and ‘organizing’ deserve some attention.
,W VKRXOGEH FOHDU WKDW WKH4XLQHDQPHWDSKRU RI ‘¿WWLQJ’ (or the related metaphors 
of ‘predicting’, ‘accounting for’, and ‘facing’) does (do) not fit the above under-
standing of conceptual schemes – the categories of a scheme do not just passively 
‘¿W’ indeterminate appearance, but play a much more active role in the ‘construc-
tion’ of determinate phenomena out of it. Of course, a conceptual category ‘fits’
WKDWZKDWLWFRQFHSWXDOO\FRQVWUXFWVDVPXFKDVDEOXHSULQW¿WVLWVEXLOWUHDOL]DWLRQ
but ‘¿WWLQJ’ in that sense misses the point, and does not help Davidson’s argument 
either. As mentioned above, the other leg of this argument is ‘non-intertranslatabili-
ty’±WR¿W(the evidence) is to be true, and to be true is to be translatable – but this 
is radical non-intertranslatability again, not the contingent or relative non-inter-
translatability intended by the (applied) scheme theorists.
The other metaphor Davidson attacked in his rejection of scheme - content dualism 
is that of ‘organization’ – schemes ‘organize’, ‘systematize’, or ‘divide up’. This is 
indeed the metaphor that Whorf uses in the quote above, but Davidson interpreted 
the term insufficiently ‘creative’ (or constructive). The result of ‘organization’ is 
fundamentally different from its raw materials, and in that sense, the process ‘cre-
ates’ or ‘constructs’ more than that it re-organizes, which is more or less Davidson’s
understanding. Furthermore, Davidson misunderstood the nature of the raw materi-
al. He correctly deduced that it is essential to the idea of conceptual schemes ‘that
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there be something neutral and common that lies outside all schemes’ (p.190). This 
is what was identified above as noumenal reality, although strictly speaking it is 
not noumenal reality itself that is ‘organized’ (etc.) but the indeterminate appear-
ance caused by it. While Rorty (1972) argued that this must be the ‘subject matter’
(Davidson’s term) of schemes, and despite the many metaphors (‘reality’, ‘the 
world’, etc.) pointing in that direction, Davidson argued that it cannot be, because 
then translation would be possible. And the only alternative ‘subject matter’ of ‘or-
ganization’ he could think of was determinate phenomena, which indeed would 
make little sense.
In the ’88 version of the argument neither the ‘¿WWLQJ’ nor the ‘organization’ meta-
phor plays an important (explicit) role, and more importantly, Davidson correctly 
LGHQWL¿HG LQGHWHUPLQDWHDSSHDUDQFHDV WKH (or a possible) ‘subject matter’ of ‘orga-
nization’ (the term he used was ‘sensory experience’). The focus in this argument, 
however, shifted to the idea that there is ‘an element in the mind untouched by 
conceptual interpretation’ (p. 40), ‘an ultimate source of evidence the character of 
ZKLFKFDQEHZKROO\VSHFL¿HGZLWKRXWUHIHUHQFHWRZKDW LW LVHYLGHQFHIRU’ (p. 42)
and that is, in that sense, subjective; or the notion of ‘purely private, subjective 
“objects of the mind”’ (p. 46). This version of the argument is very similar to Sel-
lars’s (1956) rejection of the ‘myth of the given’, the idea that there are non-infer-
ential (pre-conceptual) inner episodes that are conditions (RU MXVWL¿FDWLRQV) of em-
pirical knowledge. Aside from the question whether this idea is necessary for, or 
even present in, applied conceptual relativism (and many other scheme theories),
there is a more fundamental problem in both the ’74 and the ’88 versions of the ar-
gument: the idea of ‘content’ as a source of ‘evidence’.
A scheme does not have content, and neither do the ‘concepts’ that consitute it; and 
there is no ‘evidence’ for a conceptual construction (‘¿WWLQJ’, ‘organization’, etc.).
Perhaps a phenomenal analogy is illustrative here. Consider a particular house: the 
building plans or blueprints are the scheme used in constructing it out of raw mate-
rial such as bricks and mortar. The scheme (blueprint) does not have content (or at 
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least not in a here relevant sense), but perhaps the particular house does in the 
sense that it consists of bricks and mortar. But those raw materials are not ‘evi-
dence’ for anything; not for the scheme (blueprint), and neither for the particular 
house.
On the other hand, sentences may have content, and evidence if they describe 
events or states of affairs. As argued by Lynch (1997) and Wang (2009), it is the 
4XLQHDQQRWLRQRIFRQFHSWXDOVFKHPHVWKDW'DYLGVRQRSSRVHV(and mistakes for the 
‘very idea’) DQGZLWK WKDWQRWLRQ FRPH VHQWHQWLDO ODQJXDJHDQG4XLQH’s variant of 
empiricism. However, neither the concept of ‘content’, nor that of ‘evidence’ makes 
much sense outside an empiricist context, and consequently, the argument against 
VFKHPH  FRQFHSW GXDOLVP LV DQ DUJXPHQW DJDLQVW HPSLULFLVP DQG DJDLQVW4XLQH
not against conceptual schemes (in general); or so it seems. As mentioned in the 
previous section, the relationship between indeterminate appearance and phenome-
nal experience is causal rather than epistemic (as evidence) and Davidson does not 
object to the latter: ‘Of cause there are causal intermediaries. What we must guard 
against are epistemic intermediaries’ (1983, p.144).
Although with the rejection of the concept of ‘content’ the ‘scheme - content dual-
ism’ evaporates, not all arguments against the latter become automatically invalid. 
The charge against ‘purely private subjective objects of the mind’ and against the 
consequent possibility ‘that we are systematically and generally deceived’ by our 
senses (p.42) still stands. There is a dualism of phenomena and noumena underly-
ing the scheme - content dualism, a dualism that disconnects words (or phenomena)
from the (noumenal) world, and that introduces subjectivity and the possibility of 
massive error. It is that dualism that Davidson objects to (in many of his writings, 
not just in the two papers mentioned thus far); and it is the rejection of this dual-
ism, rather than the misdirected arguments in the ’74 paper, that applied conceptual 
relativism has to address.
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the subjectivity of appearances and schemes
,I WKHUHLVDVLJQL¿FDQWGLVFUHSDQF\EHWZHHQWKHQRXPHQDODQGSKHQRPHQDOZRUOGV
such that determinate phenomena are nothing like their noumenal grounds or 
causes, then it could be said that the phenomenal world is nothing but ‘illusion’,
that we are ‘systematically and generally deceived’, or that we are prey to ‘massive
error’. In the summary of the basic idea of applied relativism above, such a dis-
crepancy could be the result of subjectivity of either schemes (or the concepts / 
universals in those), indeterminate appearance, or both. However, most conceptual 
relativists assume indeterminate appearance to be subjective only in the rather min-
imal sense of the limitations of perception caused by the senses of the perceiving 
subject (which may be technologically expanded), and by the subject’s location re-
spective to noumena (‘point of view’ in the literal sense), and according to David-
son, this kind of subjectivity is mere empirical accident without philosophical sig-
QL¿FDQFH(1988, p.45).
The subjectivity of appearances is related to the identity or non-identity of phe-
nomena and their noumenal grounds or causes. Roughly, four different positions 
concerning this relationship can be distinguished: (1) direct realism, (2) perspectiv-
ism, (3) reflectionism, and (4) subjective idealism or anti-realism. The first of 
WKHVHGLUHFWUHDOLVPLGHQWL¿HVSKHQRPHQDZLWKQRXPHQDRUPRUHDFFXUDWHO\GRHV
not recognize the distinction, and is therefore, incoherent with relativism. The last, 
subjective idealism or anti-realism, rejects the noumenal grounding (or causing) of 
phenomena, and is thus indeed radically subjective. This position, however, con-
flicts with the common sense realism that is generally implicitly assumed in ap-
plied relativism, but also clashes with the idea and purpose of science as it is com-
monly conceived, and it is in the context of scientific explanation that applied 
relativisms are proposed. (Although some scholars of a post-modernist bend may 
seem to favor a more radical and anti-realist relativism.) In other words, (1) is too 
strong and (4) is too weak (or the other way around) for applied relativism, which 
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leaves (2) perspectivism and (3)UHÀHFWLRQLVP
According to perspectivism the same object looks different from different perspec-
tives, different points of view (in a quite literal sense), but these different ‘looks’
are equally true. (Note that this is what Mou (2009) calls ‘objective perspectivism’,
and not Nietzsche’s (subjective) ‘perspectivism’, although there seems to be little 
agreement about what exactly that entails.) In the perspectivist perspective, con-
cepts, universals, or the categories of a scheme are real noumenal categories; phe-
nomenal properties are real noumenal properties. However, any phenomenal de-
scription only captures a ‘part of the picture’, only some aspects of the real 
(complete) nature of noumena. Consequence of perspectivism is that increasing 
perspectives increases knowledge, as in the often overlooked but essential state-
ment in the quote from Whorf above: ‘the person most nearly free to describe na-
ture with absolute impartiality would be a linguist familiar with very many widely 
different linguistic systems’ (although the insertion of ‘nearly’ may imply that 
Whorf is not a perspectivist in a strict sense).
According to UHÀHFWLRQLVP, which is related to skepticism, a perception, like a re-
ÀHFWLRQLVGHSHQGHQWRQERWKWKHSURSHUWLHVRIWKHREMHFWDQGRIWKHUHÀHFWLQJVXU-
face. ‘Human understanding is like an uneven mirror that, receiving rays from 
things, mixes its own nature with the nature of [those] things, and thus distorts and 
obscures them’ (Francis Bacon, Novum Organum I.XLI).
1
 Consequently, phenomena 
have noumenal grounds or causes, but are not identical to those; and concepts, uni-
versals, or the categories of a scheme are not real noumenal categories, but depen-
dent on some real (but unknowable) characteristics of noumenal reality.
'KDUPDNƯUWL H[WHQGHG 'LJQƗJD’s definition of indeterminate appearance 
(SUDWLEKƗVD) as ‘non-conceptual’ZLWK WKHTXDOL¿FDWLRQ ‘non-erroneous’ (DEKUƗQWD),
and a similar assumption can be found in Davidson’s philosophy and in applied 
1　Estque intellectus humanus instar speculi inaequalis ad radios rerum, qui suam naturam naturae 
UHUXPLPPLVFHWHDPTXHGLVWRUTXHWHWLQ¿FLW
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relativism – indeterminate appearance (within its biological and technical limits)
does not ‘falsify’ or ‘misrepresent’ noumenal reality (those terms do not even make 
much sense in this context). Consequently, any subjectivity could only arise in the 
VWDJHRI FRQFHSWXDO FRQVWUXFWLRQ ,Q HLWKHU UHÀHFWLRQLVPRU SHUVSHFWLYLVP LQGHWHU-
minate appearance caused by noumena is ‘determined’ (constructively transformed 
and categorized) by or through conceptual categories, the elements of schemes, and 
if these schemes would (or could) be subjective, even non-subjective indeterminate 
appearance would (or could) result in subjective phenomena. However, although 
(the possibility of) the subjectivity of schemes is rarely (explicitly) considered by 
applied relativists, an argument against such subjectivity can be found in the com-
mon idea of the relativity of relativity (or the dependence of dependence) itself. 
The essence of this idea is that the independent in the conceptual relativism, the 
conceptual scheme, is the dependent in a further relativism. And the independent in 
that further relativism is something that is considered to be more fundamental. 
Schemes may be dependent, for example, on a real economic base (Marx), on the 
interplay of culture and environment (Whorf), or on experiment and observation 
(Kuhn). However, economy and culture are themselves phenomenal (and therefore, 
scheme-constructed), and what is salient in our environment and how experiments 
and observations are interpreted is also largely dependent on our (prior) conceptual 
schemes (and, of course, the scholars mentioned were well aware of that). Hence, 
the dependency seems to lead to circularity – a scheme depends on a scheme – but 
the latter scheme is shared, and so are the constructed phenomena. Economy, cul-
ture, salient things in our environment, and interpretations of experiments and ob-
servations may be phenomena, but they are shared phenomena. And if phenomenal 
constructions are shared (and the scheme that constructs them), so must be the ma-
terial out of which they are constructed – indeterminate appearance; and that in 
turn can only be shared if it comes from a shared source – the noumenal world. 
The noumenal dependency is indirect – schemes are dependent on shared phenom-
enal realities that are constructed by more fundamental shared schemes that are de-
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pendent on prior shared phenomenal realities, and so forth; and with each further 
cycle the noumenal dependency increases.
There is no shortcut to the noumenal world. Davidson argued convincingly that 
‘words and thoughts (...) are necessarily about the sorts of objects and events that 
commonly cause them’ (1988, p. 45), but those ‘objects and events’ are phenome-
nal; hence, themselves constructed by prior schemes. Nevertheless, even if there is 
no shortcut, that does not mean that the detour through economy, culture, and so 
forth is necessary for any (kind of) concept(s). As Davidson and others have 
shown, the simple fact that we have, can use, and can learn words implies that they 
are about real things (even if that being-about-ness is indirect). Ibn Rushd (Aver-
roes), for example, argued in his fourth proof of the ‘eternity of the world’ in the 
Tahafut al-tahafut (Incoherence of the incoherence) that even though ‘universals 
exist only in the mind, not in the external world’ they must have an external (nou-
menal) basis (van den Bergh 1954, p. 65ff). A universal (concept, word, etc.) is 
formed by abstracting a ‘common nature’ from particulars (individuals), but such 
abstracting cannot take place if there is nothing to abstract, if that common nature, 
the external (noumenal) basis of the universal, would be unreal (see also Leaman 
1988). Somewhat similarly, Davidson argued – most elaborately in his theory of 
triangulation (e.g. 1982) – that concept formation necessarily connects words to 
WKHLUQRXPHQDOFDXVHVDQGWKHVDPHEDVLFLGHDFDQDOVREHIRXQGLQ'KDUPDNƯUWL’s
theory of apoha (Dreyfus 1997; Brons 2011), and perhaps in Zhuangzi, often un-
derstood as a relativist or a skeptic and mentioned in the introduction as a possible 
perspectivist, who wrote that ‘a path is created by walking it, a thing is (called) as 
it is by it being called so’ (2.6:道行之而成、物謂之而然).
However, neither the communicative grounding of concepts nor the ‘detour’ char-
acterized as ‘the relativity of relativity’ above leads to the REMHFWLYLW\ of conceptual 
schemes and/or phenomenal experience (but in the latter cases that was not the 
purpose of those arguments either). Concepts are conventions originating in com-
munication about shared experiences, and such conventions are necessarily inter-
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VXEMHFWLYHDQGQRXPHQDOGHSHQGHQWEXWWKDWLVLQVXI¿FLHQWIRUREMHFWLYLW\,WLV±DW
least in principle – possible that (some) FRQFHSWXDO FRQVWUXFWLRQ DQG FODVVL¿FDWLRQ
creates arbitrary boundaries, both of ‘things’ and of classes of things, in what is 
noumenally continuous. Neither the outer boundary of what is recognized as a cer-
tain (conceptualized) phenomenon, nor the boundary of the conceptual class it be-
longs to (as what it is conceptualized) needs to have a noumenal equivalent. If ‘ob-
jectivity’ means that phenomenal experiences accurately capture noumenal features 
(and that seems to be the intended meaning in this context), then such arbitrary 
boundaries are non-objective (because they are arbitrary and lack noumenal coun-
terparts), and since there seems to be little reason to assume that noumenal reality 
is necessarily composed out of (nothing but) discrete objects that belong to unam-
biguously and non-fuzzily bounded classes, the aforementioned inter-subjectivity 
and noumenal-dependency of schemes and concepts is all we can derive. Such in-
WHUVXEMHFWLYLW\DQGQRXPHQDOGHSHQGHQF\KRZHYHU LV VXI¿FLHQW WRSUHFOXGH ‘mas-
sive error’, which was Davidson’s main objection to the dualism of noumena and 
phenomena – we cannot have conceptual conventions that are necessarily grounded 
in noumenal reality and completely ‘misrepresent’ that noumenal reality at the 
same time.
Neither of the two positions that cohere with applied relativism, perspectivism and 
reflectionism, (necessarily) implies the possibility of massive error. According to 
objective perspectivism, phenomenal experiences (provided that they are not hallu-
cinatory etc.) accurately – albeit only partially – ‘represent’ noumenal reality; and 
LQ D UHÀHFWLRQLVP WKDW UHFRJQL]HV WKH (necessary) inter-subjectivity and noumenal-
dependency of concepts and schemes, the (arbitrarily) constructed nature of at least 
some phenomenal experiences does not mean that phenomenal reality on the whole 
is, or even can be, a deception. That, in turn, means that any applied relativism that 
can be made coherent with either objective perspectivism, or such an inter-subjec-
WLYHUHÀHFWLRQLVP(or some kind of combination of the two), is not just immune to 
Davidson’s explicit attack on conceptual schemes, but also to the implicit attack in 
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his arguments against subjectivity and massive error. Not much charity is needed to 
read many, if not most of the theories mentioned in the introduction as variants of 
(objective) perspectivism or (inter-subjective)UHÀHFWLRQLVPPRUHOLNHO\PDQ\PD\
have even been intended as such, and some of them contain direct clues, such as 
the aforementioned apparent perspectivism in Whorf’s theory. 
In conclusion then, as a refutation of (4XLQHDQ) empiricism and associated concep-
tual schemes, Davidson’s attack may have been successful, but as a refutation of 
applied relativism, the attack missed its target. Davidson’s attack failed because he 
identified all forms of conceptual relativism, including applied relativism, with 
4XLQHDQVFKHPHVDQGHPSLULFLVP ,QWHUHVWLQJO\ WKLVPLVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQDQG WKHFRQ-
sequent failure to make sense of applied relativism illustrate the very idea of (such)
conceptual schemes – Davidson read the applied relativists from within his own 
conceptual scheme, hence as (post-)4XLQHDQ DQDO\WLF SKLORVRSKHUV UDWKHU WKDQ DV
thinking and writing from within their own. In other words, the misunderstanding 
is the result of different conceptual schemes (in the applied relativists’ sense), and 
consequently, Davidson’s argument against conceptual schemes ends up proving 
the applied relativists’ point more than refuting it.
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